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THE CASE FOR THE REPEAL AMENDMENT
·

RANDY E. BARNETT

Today, a political movement has arisen to oppose what seems to be a
highly discretionary and legally unconstrained federal government.l
Beginning in the Bush Administration during the Panic of 2008 and
accelerating during the Obama Administration, the federal government has
bailed out or taken over banks, car companies,2 and student loans. 3 It is now
preparing to vastly expand the Internal Revenue Service to help it take
charge of the practice of medicine for the first time in American history.4
This marked and rapid increase of power has shaken many Americans
who are now looking to the United States Constitution with renewed
interest in the limits it imposes on the powers of Congress. Despite what the
Constitution says, however, federal judges have allowed Congress to
exceed its enumerated powers for so lon¥, it seems they no longer entertain
even the possibility of enforcing the text.
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law
Center. I wish to thank Anastasia Killian for her research assistance. Permission for
instructors to distribute this essay for educational purposes is hereby granted.
*

I.

See,

e.g.,

TEA PARTY PATRIOTS,

Mission Statement

and Core

Values,

http://www.teapartypatriots.org/Mission.aspx (last visited May 5, 2011) (noting that the
"impetus for the Tea Party movement is excessive government spending and taxation"). The
Tea Party is not the only political movement opposing the unchecked growth of federal
power, but it is one of the most visible and influential. See Randy E. Barnett, The Tea Party,
the Constitution, and the Repeal Amendment, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. Colloquy 281 (2011),
http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/20IIIIO.
2. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§
101-136, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767-3800 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-41)
(creating the Troubled Assets Relief Program ("TARP")). Companies receiving TARP
money, to name only a few, include Citigroup, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Wells
Fargo, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, PNC Financial Services Group, U.S. Bancorp,
Capital One Financial, Regions Financial Corporation, SunTrust, GMAC Financial Services,
General Motors, and Chrysler. See Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA.ORG, http://bailout.
propublica.org/list/index (last visited May 5, 2011).
3. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§§ 2201-13, 124 Stat. 1071-81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
(ending federal subsidies of student loans, consolidating existing student loans, and granting
the federal government authority to issue and oversee future loans).
4. See id. § 1002, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032-33 (codified as amended at 1.R.c. § 5000A
(West 2010)) (imposing penalties on individuals who fail to maintain minimum essential
coverage); H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, l l lTH CONG., THE WRONG PRESCRIPTION:
DEMOCRATS' HEALTH OVERHAUL DANGEROUSLY EXPANDS IRS AUTHORITY 4, 7-9 (2010)
(estimating the "IRS may need to hire as many as 16,500 additional auditors, agents, and
other employees" to implement the new Act).
5. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. I (2005) (holding that Congress has the
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Judges appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents
,
largely operate within what academics call the ''New Deal settlement.' (j By
this it is meant that the courts allow Congress to exercise unchecked power
over the national economy and everything that may affect it, limited only
by the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 7 In this arena, with some
exceptions, the post-New Deal judiciary disagrees only on whether other
unenumerated rights may also receive protection and, if so, which ones.8
But whatever few additional "fundamental" rights may be recognized, they
do not include the protection of any so-called "economic liberty" that might
inhibit the national regime of economic regulation. 9
In this manner, the original scheme of islands of federal powers in a sea
of liberty has been transformed into a regime of islands of rights in a vast
sea of national power.IO But judicial passivism is not the only cause of
expanding congressional power. Also responsible are two changes to the
Constitution's structure that were made in 1913 as "populist" or
"progressive" reforms but which fundamentally altered the relationship
between the federal government, the states, and the people as it appears in
the Constitution's text.II
The fIrst change was the Sixteenth Amendment. 1 2 By giving Congress
the power to impose an income tax, the amendment allowed Congress to
tax, spend, and redistribute income to a degree previously unimaginable.
The Sixteenth Amendment has enabled Congress to evade the limits placed

authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana
in accordance with state law). Justice Thomas's dissent states, "If Congress can regulate this
under the Commerce Clause, then it can regulate virtually anything-and the Federal
Government is no longer one of limited and enumerated powers." Id. at 57-58 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
6. See, e.g. , Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78
N.Y.V. L. REv. 875, 880 (2003); Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal Alternative to
Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 77 V. CHI. L. REv. 887,903 (2010); Laura
Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. RIST. REv. 1052,
1066 (2005); Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARv. L. REv. 4,122 (2001).
7. See Kramer, supra note 6,at 125.
8. Compare Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 706 (1997) (declining to
recognize physician-assisted suicide as a "fundamental right" protected by the Due Process
Clause), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding state sodomy law
unconstitutional without employing the two-step analysis used in Glucksberg).
9. See Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1479 (2008) (discussing
the evolution and operation of the Supreme Court's "fundamental rights" doctrine).
10. See STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 32 (rev. ed. 1987).
11. See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE TRAGEDY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF BACKLASH 134 (2011) (locating the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Amendments as originating in the populist movement and adopted by
progressives).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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on its power by funding all sorts of activities not otherwise within its
enumerated powers-a proposition that the Supreme Court did not accept
until 1936.13 These funds have also allowed Congress effectively to bribe
states into exercising their broader police powers as Congress sees fit.14
Once states are "hooked" on receiving federal funds, they can be coerced to
obey federal dictates or lose the revenue.
That the Sixteenth Amendment was necessary to empower Congress to
tax incomes is contested. Some maintain that the amendment was only
needed to correct an erroneous Supreme Court decision that denied
Congress this power.IS Whatever the merits of this claim, prior to the
Sixteenth Amendment, Congress had not taxed income except in times of
war.16 Since 1913, Congress has taxed income at an increasing rate and
used the revenues to vastly expand its reach beyond its enumerated powers
as even the post-New Deal Supreme Court defines them, co-opting state
governments to do its bidding in ways it could not do itself.
The second structural change was the Seventeenth Amendment,
providing for the direct election of United States senators by the voters of
each state.17 Under the original Constitution, senators were selected by state
legislatures.18 Senators could therefore be expected to provide some check
on the growth of federal power at the expense of the reserved powers of the
states. How much of a check on federal interference with state governments
this constraint ever provided cannot be assessed with any precision. In
addition, the selection of senators by state legislatures was being phased out
by the procedure of appointing senators who had prevailed in state
elections.19 Regardless of how effective the previous system may have
13. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,66 (1936) ("[T]he power of Congress to
authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct
grants ofiegislative power found in the Constitution.").
14. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (allowing federal funding to
be conditioned on states exercising their legislative powers as Congress wishes).
IS. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (declaring the
Income Tax of 1894 unconstitutional as it violated the requirement that direct taxes be
apportioned); see, e.g., MAGLIOCCA, supra note II, at 77 ("Almost nobody prior to Pollock
thought that Congress lacked the authority to impose an income tax."); id. at 76-87
(discussing Pollock extensively).
16. See e.g., Revenue Act of 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309, repealed by
Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 89, 12 Stat. 432, 473. The Revenue Act of 1862 replaced
the flat tax imposed by the previous Act with a progressive tax rate. See id. § 90, 12 Stat.
473. The Revenue Act of 1862 specified that the income tax it created would terminate after
June 30,1866. See id. § 92,12 Stat. 474.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3,cl. l .
19. See Senate Historical Office, Direct Election of Senators, u.s. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm
(last visited May 5,2011) (noting that as many as twenty-nine states directly elected senators
by 1912).
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been, the Seventeenth Amendment eliminated the only structural "check"
on federal power that the Founders provided to state governments in the
original Constitution.
All this was accomplished because, throughout the twentieth century,
the growth of federal power was popular enough that political movements
were able to successfully push for constitutional amendments. These groups
were also able to elect presidents who would nominate judges who adopted
a latitudinarian construction of federal power, along with senators who
would confirm them. To the extent that the popularity of unfettered federal
power is waning-and only time will tell if this is a blip or a trend-those
who would limit federal power need to address the twentieth-century
changes to the text of the Constitution and to its interpretation by courts.
A constitutional amendment, or amendments, to constrain Congress is
one option. But what sort of amendment? The most obvious type would be
a provision like the First Amendment commanding that "Congress shall or
shall not do X." However, any additional text that relies on judicial
enforcement would likely be undermined by the same post-New Deal
judicial philosophy that construed existing constitutional constraints out of
existence. What is needed is a structural check on federal power residing
not in the judiciary but elsewhere.
One proposal is the Repeal Amendment, which has already been
introduced into Congress and will also be considered by state legislatures.
The Repeal Amendment would give two-thirds of the states the power to
repeal any federal law or regulation. Its text is simple, and its effect is
transparent:
Any provision of law or regulation of the United States may be repealed
by the several states, and such repeal shall be effective when the
legislatures of two-thirds of the several states approve resolutions for this
purpose that particularly describe the same provision or provisions of law
2o
or regulation to be repealed.

On May 12, 2011, this proposal was reintroduced before
Representatives by Rep. Bob Bishop and introduced before
Sen. Michael Enzi. 2 1 In the same month, Florida became
legislature to call for an Article V convention to adopt
Amendment. 22

the House of
the Senate by
the first state
this proposed

20. H.R.J. Res. 542, l l 1th Congo (2010).
21. See S.J. Res. 12, 112th Congo (2011); H.R.J. Res. 62, 112th Congo (2011); see
generally Mike Enzi & Bob Bishop, Introducing the Repeal Amendment, FOXNEWS.COM
(May 12, 2011), http://www.foxnews.comlopinionl2011105/12/sen-mike-enzi-rep-rob
bishop-introducing-repeal-amendmentl.
22. See S. Con. Res. 1558, 2011 S., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); H. Mem. 1429, 2011 H.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011).
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At present, the only way for states to contest a federal law or regulation
is to bring a constitutional challenge in federal court or seek an amendment
to the Constitution. A state repeal power would provide a targeted way to
reverse particular congressional acts and administrative regulations without
either relying on federal judges or permanently amending the text of the
Constitution just to correct a specific abuse of federal power.
A state repeal power should not be confused with the power of federal
courts to "nullify" unconstitutional laws. Unlike the judiciary, under the
Repeal Amendment, states can reject a federal law for policy reasons that
are irrelevant to constitutional concerns. In this sense, a state repeal power
is more like the President's veto power, though it can be applied to any
existing law or regulation that has already been enacted.
This provision would help restore the original balance between state
and federal power and allow states to protect the liberties and rights of their
citizens, as well as their own operations, from overreaching federal power.
It places confidence in the collective wisdom of the men and women from
diverse backgrounds, elected by diverse constituencies, who comprise the
modern legislatures of two-thirds of the states. Put another way, it allows
thousands of democratically elected representatives outside the Beltway to
check the will of535 elected representatives in Washington, D.C.
Compare this with the presidential veto power held by a single person
or the power of five justices to nullify a law they find unconstitutional. But
unlike a law declared unconstitutional, nothing in the Amendment would
prevent Congress from reenacting a repealed measure if it felt that two
thirds of state legislatures were somehow out of touch with popular
sentiment. Unlike the presidential veto, congressional reenactment would
require just a simple majority. In effect, with this power the states could
force Congress to take a second look at a controversial law.
Americans revere their Constitution, but thei, have also acted politically
to improve it. The Thirteenth2 3 and Fourteenth 4 Amendments limited the
original power of states to violate the fundamental rights of theIr own
citizens, while the Fifteenth25 and Nineteenth26 Amendments prohibited
disfranchisement based on race and sex, respectively. Additionally, the
Twenty-first Amendment 27 repealed another "progressive" reform: the
Eighteenth Amendment that empowered Congress to prohibit alcohol.28
The Repeal Amendment alone will not cure all the current problems
with federal power. Getting two-thirds of state legislatures to agree on
repealing a federal law will not be easy, and repeal will only happen if a
law is highly unpopular. Perhaps its most important effect will be deterring
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See U.S. CaNST. amend. XIII.
See U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
See U.S. CaNST. amend. XIX.
See U.S. CaNST. amend. XXI.
See U.S. CaNST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
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even further expansions o f federal power. Just a s Congress must now
contemplate the President's veto, so too would it need to anticipate how
states will react.
While it is no panacea, the Repeal Amendment would restore the states'
ability to protect the powers "reserved to the states" noted in the Tenth
Amendment. 2 9 Moreover, it would provide citizens with another political
avenue to protect the "rights . . . retained by the people" to which the Ninth
Amendment refers. 3 0 In short, the Repeal Amendment would provide a new
political check on the threat to American liberties posed by a runaway
federal government.
The Repeal Amendment has already drawn some criticism. First, the
Washington Post's Dana Milbank tried to associate the measure with
racism: "[T]here's the unfortunate echo of nullification-the right asserted
by states to ignore federal laws they found objectionable-and the 'states'
rights' argument that was used to justify slavery and segregation.,,3 1 But,
this association is imaginary. Undermining civil rights is simply not on the
agenda of anyone who favors this amendment. Even before the Civil War,
two-thirds of the states never supported slavery or segregation. Had the
Repeal Amendment existed then, at least half the states, though not two
thirds, would have used this power in an attempt to repeal the Fugitive
Slave Acts, both of which were enacted by Congress. 3 2 Today, reaching the
two-thirds threshold would require the support of many states from
different parts of the country, blue as well as red. As will be further
explained below, the two-thirds threshold ensures a broad and bipartisan
political consensus.
In addition to Milbank's criticism, Slate's Dahlia Lithwick and Jeff
Shesol attempted to find a contradiction in Repeal Amendment supporters'
professed love for the Constitution: "For a party (whether of the Tea or
Grand Old variety) that sees the Constitution as something so perfect as to
have been divinely inspired, the idea that it needs to be altered
,,
fundamentally is beyond crediting . . . . 3 3 But the amendment process of

29. See U. S. CaNST. amend. X.
30. U. S. CONST. amend. IX.
31. Dana Milbank,A Strange Way to Honor the Founding Fathers, WASH. POST, Dec.
1,2010,http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentlarticle/2010/12/01/AR201012
0105576.html.
32. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,ch. 60,§§ 1-10,9 Stat. 462,462-..Q5 (repealed 1865);
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7,§§ 1-4,1 Stat. 302,302-05 (repealed 1865); see Map of
Free and Slave States, SLAVERY, http://www.sonofthesouth.netlslavery/slave-mapslmap
free-slave-states.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2011). In 1857, there were 31 states. Fifteen
permitted slavery, and sixteen had either abolished or never permitted slavery. Twenty-one
states would have been required to meet the two-thirds threshold.
33. Dahlia Lithwick & Jeff Shesol, Repealing Common Sense: The Conservative
Mission to Destroy the Constitution in Order to Save It, SLATE, Dec. 3, 2010,
http://www.slate.comlidl2276463.
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Article V is part of the original Constitution. And, as was noted above, 34
this process has already been used to alter the original scheme by allowing
a national income tax and eliminating the power of state legislatures to
select United States senators. Add to this that the judicial construction of
the Constitution has vastly expanded federal power in just the past sixty
years. To the extent Lithwick and Shesol sincerely care about the original
Constitution, the Repeal Amendment is simply restoring some semblance of
the original state-federal balance.
Then the editors of the New York Times weighed in with objections that
are a little harder to fathom. They noted, "Under the Tea Party proposal, the
states would have much greater power than the president to veto federal
laws. Because the amendment includes no limit on the time in which states
could exercise their veto, it would cast a long shadow over any program
,,
under federal law. 35 Oetting both houses of the legislatures of two-thirds of
the states to repeal a federal law, however, would be a daunting task-far
more difficult than a single President wielding a veto pen. True, older laws
can be repealed, but this is likely to happen only when these laws are no
longer perceived as current. And inserting states into the actual lawmaking
of Congress, as the veto power inserts the President in the legislative
process, would raise practical difficulties of its own, so the Repeal
Amendment avoids this by operating only after the fact.
The New York Times also made a more fundamental objection. It
rejected the notion "that the United States defined in the Constitution are a
set of decentralized sovereignties where personal responsibility, private
,,
property and a laissez-faire economy should reign. 36 Instead, it contended,
"America's fundamental law holds competing elements, some constraining
,,
the national government, others energizing it. 37 But giving two-thirds of
state legislatures a formal way to "constrain[] the national government" no
more elevates states into "sovereignties" than the veto power makes the
President a king. Giving states this option simply compensates for other
changes that have greatly expanded federal power at the expense of the
reserved powers of states and the rights retained by the people.
And, while the New York Times is quite correct in saying that "the
government the Constitution shaped was founded to create a sum greater
than the parts, to promote economic development that would lift the
,,
fortunes of the American people, 38 one crucial mechanism by which this
was accomplished was through the scheme of checks and balances. A
defect in this original scheme was an inadequate federal check on state
powers, when such powers were used by states to oppress their own
34. See supra notes 12, 17 and accompanying text.
35. Editorial, The Repeal Amendment, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 2010, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.coml2010/12/27/opinionl27mon2.html.
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id
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citizens. This defect was rectified by an amendment devised b�
Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress: The Fourteenth Amendment. 9
What is now lacking is any complementary check on federal power by the
states.
In part because the judiciary has failed to exercise its own checking
function, the powers of Congress have grown so enormously that they
swamp the operations of state governments. For this reason the Court has
recognized certain limits on Congress vis-a-vis state legisiatures4 0 and state
executive officials.4 1 The Repeal Amendment merely places an additional
structural check in the hands of democratically elected members of state
legislatures.
The only real objection of substance to the Repeal Amendment
concerns the theoretical possibility that two-thirds of the least populous
states-representing less than half of the nation's population--could stymie
legislation backed by a majority. As Milbank observes, "the 33 smallest
states, which have 33 percent of the popUlation, have the power to overrule
the 17 largest states, which have 67 percent of the population.'.42
Of course, our Constitution is as much about protecting the minority
from the tyranny of the majority as it is about majoritarian rule. Indeed, the
legitimacy of majority rule is suspect unless it is somehow constrained to
protect the rights of individuals from abuses by majorities. In other
contexts, one expects that Milbank would agree. As long as one is
fantasizing, why is it proper that densely populated, urban states could
expropriate the wealth of less populated areas-perhaps to pay their public
sector union workers large pensions? Abuses of creditors, who constituted a
small minority of the citizenry, by state legislatures appealing to the large
majority of voters who were debtors, was just one of the reasons the
Constitution was adopted in the first place.43 It was certainly not adopted to
allow a majority of voters at the national level to exploit, economically or
otherwise, a minority, which is the reason why each state is entitled to two
senators regardless of population-senators formerly selected by state
legislatures.
Nonetheless, any such counter-majoritarian scenario is highly unlikely.
Remove just seven of the least populous blue states, 44 add Florida and
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment's provisions against the states).
40. See New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992) (barring federal
commandeering of state legislatures).
41. See Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997) (barring federal commandeering
of state executives).
42. Milbank, supra note 31.
43. See U.S.CONST art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. ").
44. From least to most populous: Vermont, Delaware, Rhode Island, Hawaii, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, and Connecticut. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U. S. CENSUS
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Texas to the thirty-two remaining least populous states,45 and the result is
well over one half of the national population.46 Furthermore, this group is
comprised of a mix of states, both politically and geographically. Given that
the political valence of states is not necessarily correlated with their size,
the fear of a small state takeover is reminiscent of some of the more fevered
writings of the Antifederalists.47
Realistically, we can expect two-thirds of state legislatures to band
together to repeal a law or regulation under two circumstances. The first is
when public opinion turns against a formerly popular law or when, for
some unusual reason, a majority of the 535 individuals comprising
Congress plus the President become grossly out of step with public opinion.
Allowing elected legislators outside the Beltway to check this power is a
way of protecting, rather than undermining, truly popular governance.
In the second circumstance, Congress or a regulatory agency may have
messed with the internal operation of state governments in ways that are out
of public view. Perhaps the regulation is buried in a massive omnibus bill.
To claim a majoritarian imprimatur for such a law, or many an
administrative regulation, is pure fiction. Such measures have never been
subjected to any meaningful popular approval. Of course, if two-thirds of
the states take exception and gain its repeal and repeal is unpopular
something pretty hard to imagine-Congress can always then reenact such
a measure by a simple majority vote, ensuring that it truly reflects the views
of a congressional majority.
This highlights the ultimate safety valve built into the Repeal
Amendment: Congress can reenact anything the states manage to repeal.
Unlike a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court, Congress could
override a state repeal. And it would see a repeal movement coming from a
mile away, preparing it to reenact legislation should it feel strongly that the
states are misguided or out of touch. At the end of the day, all states may do
is force Congress to take a second look at a measure.

BUREAU: Table 2. Resident Population of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico: 2010 Census, available at http://2010.census.gov/news/press-kits/apportionment
lapport.html.
45. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Id.
46. The result is approximately 166 million. Id.
47. See, e.g., Centinel, Number I (October 5, 1797), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 235 (Ralph Ketcham ed., Signet Classic
2003) (1986). Centinel argues against bicameralism because the "smallest State in the Union
has equal weight with the great States of Virginia, Massachusetts or Pennsylvania." Centinel
also stated that the Constitution was "a most daring attempt to establish a despotic
aristocracy among freemen, that the world has ever witnessed. " Id. at 232.
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So the strongest objection to the Repeal Amendment may well be that it
is too modest to check runaway federal power effectively. But, like the
President's veto power, the threat of repeal would deter Congress from
interfering with states. Members of Congress and their staffs would have to
think about the possible reaction of state legislatures. State legislative
leaders could organize to communicate their views to Washington, and the
public would have an alternate channel of protest when the federal
government gets too out of touch.
That so modest a measure as the Repeal Amendment would so frighten
folks like Dana Milbank, Dahlia Lithwick, and the editors of the New York
Times is a sign of how far federal power has expanded. That these are the
strongest objections they could muster shows the strength of the proposal.
But the tenor of their reaction also suggests that, however modest it may be,
the Repeal Amendment is a genuine step in the right direction.

